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As firms in emerging markets are confronted with rising wages and institutional reforms  there 
has been a growing interest in the efficacy of modern HRM policies, as well as of modern 
management and of information technology, in these markets (Commander, Harrison and 
Menezes-Filho 2011; Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie and Roberts 2013). In this paper, we 
analyze an episode of organizational reform at a foreign-owned bank in Central-East Europe to 
expand our understanding of the relationship between HRM policies and performance in an 
emerging market context. Our analysis uses data from 180 branches over 20 quarters between 
2003 and 2007. Over this period, the bank rolled out new HRM policies in its branches, which 
introduced job differentiation and high-powered incentives for sales staff (but not for cashiers). 
The extent to which incentives improve performance has been an important topic in the 
personnel economics literature (Lazear 2000). Most of the literature studies the use of incentives 
for workers or teams with relatively homogeneous tasks. In our setting, workers have 
heterogeneous, but complementary, tasks. Designing optimal incentives in such a setting is 
complicated. The system introduced by the bank is consistent with the notion that workers with 
tasks that contribute to the bottom line should receive high-powered incentives, while multi-
taskers should not (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Besanko, Regibeau and Rockett 2005). 
However, differentiation of incentives has the potential to induce collusion between workers and 
more generally, quantity-based incentives carry risk in a setting such as banking where quality is 
important (Baker 2002). 
Our empirical approach that is grounded in the insider econometrics literature, a branch 
of personnel economics that has sought to use detailed knowledge of the firm to analyze the 
impact of modern HRM policies (Ichniowski and Shaw 2003; 2012). Policies of interest have 
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included incentive schemes, team work and task flexibility. To the extent that insider 
econometric studies rely on non-experimental data endogeneity bias has been an important 
methodological concern. Bias arises due to unobserved differences in (i) the performance of 
organizational units or (ii) the marginal benefit of HRM practices (which can be due to 
complementarities between practices). The first source of bias can be addressed with fixed 
effects estimation and some authors show that fixed effects effectively deal with all plausible 
sources of bias (Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997; Athey and Stern 2002). However, fixed 
effects estimation is not generally valid. 
In this paper, we use our knowledge of the process that led to the adoption of HRM 
reforms to develop and instrumental variables approach to estimating the impact of the HRM 
reforms on branch-level performance. Our IV approach makes exploits the fact that in our data, 
all branches were subject to a common set of policy decisions at headquarters even though HRM 
reforms were implemented at different times and to a different extent across branches. Hence, for 
each branch, we can use information on the implementation of HRM reforms in branches that are 
observationally similar to construct instruments that approximate the strength of the policy 
shock, but are independent of the branch-specific benefits of the policies. While our dataset is 
somewhat unique in the sense that it comprises the universe of organizational units that are 
eligible for the HRM reforms that we study our approach should be valid in other datasets. 
Specifically, our method can be applied if organizational units (be they independent firms or 
affiliated to a single one) are subject to policy shocks that are exogenous at the level of 
observation and affect the propensity that an HRM policy will be introduced. 
Using our IV approach we find that the introduction of sales staff with high-powered 
individual incentives contributes to the average sales productivity of branch employees. This 
4 
 
effect is larger in large branches, where free-riding is a problem if there are no individual 
incentives, but declines when the ratio of sales staff to other staff, who provide administrative 
and other services that are complementary to sales effort, becomes too large. However, we do not 
find that the HRM policies improved profitability, the product mix or loan quality. Overall, the 
results point to the effectiveness of the new organizational structure and bonus system in eliciting 
effort from branch staff. At the same time, the results raise some concerns about the effect of 
differentiation in incentives. 
Our results are very robust within the context of IV estimation, which controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity by replacing, in the second stage, the actual adoption of HRM reforms 
by the propensity of a branch to adopt the reforms. A weakness of this approach is that results 
may reflect structural differences between branches that correlate with the propensity for 
treatment rather than actual treatment (Blundell and Costa Dias 2009). We therefore compare our 
IV estimates to Generalized Propensity Score (GPS) estimates (Imbens 2000; Flores and Mitnik 
2013). These estimates control for selection on observable differences across branches. They 
represent estimates of the impact of the HRM reforms on branch productivity that are based on 
comparisons between branches with the same propensity for treatment but different actual 
treatment. The strength of the GPS estimates lies precisely in the area of weakness of the IV 
estimates and if the results from both estimators are similar (as they do in our case), they 
reinforce each other. 
  In what follows we first discuss the bank and our data (section II). We next discuss 
related literature an empirical predictions (section III). Subsequently, we present our IV approach 
(section IV) and findings (section V). We present further robustness tests in the form of GPS 
estimation in section VI and we conclude in section 0. 
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II. Background and Data 
Banking in the CEE region has changed dramatically since the early 1990s when there were 
primarily universal, state-owned banks that suffered from an overhang of bad debts and were 
known for poor management and service (Buch 1997; Berglof and Bolton 2002). Today, all 
countries in the region have a modern banking sector with relatively well-managed banks with 
foreign ownership and a range of client-friendly products on offer. 
The bank that we study is a leading financial institution in its market and has over 200 
branches that serve retail and SME clients. Upon privatization in the late 1990s, a majority of 
shares were acquired by a West-European bank, which later purchased the remaining shares. 
 We have access to quarterly branch-level balance sheets and profit and loss statements 
covering the five-year period from 2003 to 2007. The data include a quarterly overview of staff 
for each branch, broken down by functions. The objective of the branches is to maximize the 
“sales” of deposits, loans and savings products to retail and SME clients. In the context of this 
paper, it is appropriate to think of branches as “outlets” rather than “mini-banks”. A branch’s 
ability to lend is restricted by rules related to the assessment of creditworthiness of borrowers but 
not by its intake of deposits – the loan-deposit balance is monitored at the bank level. 
Following acquisition, the foreign owner introduced a range of organizational reforms, 
initially to improve governance, risk management and cost-effectiveness. We focus on the 
second phase of reforms during which the bank sought to improve the commercial orientation 
and client focus of the branches. The reforms had three key elements. First, there was an effort to 
improve client segmentation into high-value and regular clients. Second, mirroring the 
segmentation of clients, the bank created a new functional structure. Under the old structure, 
there were differences in seniority, but function profiles were otherwise ill-defined (figure 1). In 
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2003 the bank introduced “bankers,” who focus on high-value clients within either the retail or 
SME market. Two years later, the bank created “advisor” functions. Like bankers, advisors are 
expected to focus on sales and client relations, but instead of engaging with specific clients, they 
specialize in specific products such as mortgages and contractual savings. The banker and 
advisor functions were not created all at once and we use variation in the number of bankers and 
advisors over time and across branches to evaluate the impact of the reforms. 
With the introduction of the banker and advisor functions, remaining branch staff was 
expected to focus on administrative and transactional services as well as sales of regular 
products. The bank created specific function profiles and training programs for both bankers and 
advisors and although most of the recruitment for these functions happened within branches, the 
process was perceived as a clear shift in the valuation of skills. 
The third key element of the branch-level reforms involved the introduction of a new 
incentive system. Before 2003, performance bonuses put a significant weight on branch profits, 
which are far removed from branch employees' day-to-day activities. Under the new system, 
bonuses are largely based on performance towards sales targets. Regular branch staff receive a 
bonus of 10 percent of their regular salary if the branch as a whole meets 70 percent of its target. 
The maximum bonus is 40 percent of salary if the branch hits 200 percent of target performance. 
Advisors have the same bonus curve, but their performance is measured on the basis of a 70/30 
weighted average of progress towards individual sales targets and branch-level sales targets. The 
performance of bankers is also measured as a 70/30 weighted average of individual and branch 
performance. However, the bonus curve of bankers is steeper. Bankers can receive a maximum 
bonus of 75 percent of their regular salary when they reach 150 percent of target sales. 
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To determine sales targets, the bank uses an econometric model to estimate the sales 
potential of each branch on the basis of local economic variables and sales experience in the 
region. The sales performance of any branch has only a small impact on the central tendency in 
the regression line that establishes future sales targets. This limits ratchet effects and strategic 
behavior to influence targets (Weitzman 1980; Murphy 2000). Low performance in the current 
period leads to an immediate drop in bonuses, but not to lower future lending targets.
1
 
In our sample period, the bank also conducted a variety of training programs for both new 
and existing employees, including an executive education program for branch managers. We 
control for this “Leadership Academy” in our empirical analysis, but this program was 
introduced too late into our sample period to expect a measurable impact on performance. The 
impact of other training programs, as well as the introduction of the service standards, is 
absorbed in time fixed effects. 
Table 1 gives an overview of our data and in particular of changes in the functional 
structure in the branches. In panel A, the branches are divided in three groups by size. The 
smallest branches focus exclusively on retail clients and even by the end of the sample period, 
they have only a limited number of bankers and advisors. Indeed, in 2007, the bank decided to 
discontinue some of the advisor positions in these branches because it felt that they were not 
sufficiently productive relative to cost. In medium and especially in large branches, the number 
of bankers per employee increases in 2003 and 2004 and then stabilizes. The same happens with 
advisors in 2005 and 2006. Large branches have a stronger focus on SME clients and also a 
larger share of SME bankers per employee. Panel B of the table shows that the appointment of 
retail and SME bankers is associated with higher loan growth and higher profitability. 
                                                 
1
 The regression approach did not work to the bank’s satisfaction for SME products. Targets for SME loans and 
deposits are based on assumptions about achievable sales per employee. 
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III. Related Literature and Empirical Predictions 
The new organizational structure of the branches, while probably not uncommon, is complex in 
the sense that it involves heterogeneity of functions, complementarity between tasks and 
differentiated incentives. As a result, it is difficult to judge whether the incentive system is 
optimal given the roles of bankers, advisors and other employees and vice versa (Besanko, 
Regibeau and Rockett 2005; Corts 2007). Nevertheless, the literature provides us with substantial 
insight into the likely impact of the reforms on branch performance. 
 Theory suggests that the new bonus system will improve sales productivity overall and in 
particular in branches with banker or advisor positions. In terms of the principal-agent model, the 
bonus system strengthens the link between effort directed at sales and the signal (sales rather 
than profits) that is used to determine the bonus. For bankers and advisors, individual sales 
targets should also reduce free riding – this is especially important in large branches where the 
incentive to free ride is largest in the absence of individual targets (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). 
In combination with the bonus system, the redefinition of function profiles ought to 
enhance branch performance further. First, Lazear (2000) shows that high-powered incentives 
not only induce more effort, but also improve performance because they attract workers who are 
more productive. Within the bank, the creation of banker and advisor positions facilitated 
matching of employees to functions. While we do not have data on individuals, we were told that 
several cashiers became very successful in banker positions while some former branch managers 
moved into support roles and not be subject to high-powered incentives. Second, the incentive 
structure is aligned with the view that bankers and advisors should focus on making sales, 
whereas administrative staff and cashiers are multi-taskers who make sales but also provide 
support services (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). Specifically, Besanko, Regibeau and Rockett 
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(2005) argue that a "functional" organization with function specific reward schedules becomes 
more desirable if one function (e.g., sales) makes a higher marginal contribution to performance 
than another (e.g., support services) and if certain activities generate externalities (cashiers serve 
both retail and SME customers and support performance in both product segments).  
Beyond the main effects of the reforms on employee effort and matching, the literature 
also suggests potential drawbacks. First, administrative and transaction services performed by 
cashiers are complementary to the sales effort by bankers and advisors. Corts (2007) argues that 
this arrangement may lead to under-provision of effort by workers who are not rewarded for an 
important output. This is especially true if workers lack “intrinsic motivation” which they are 
assumed to have by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). In our empirical context, effective delivery 
of service effort by cashiers is especially important if there is a high number of bankers and 
advisors relative to the number of cashiers. We therefore expect that the impact of additional 
bankers on branch productivity eventually declines with the number of bankers per cashier. 
 Another drawback of the differentiation in incentives is that it invites collusion among 
branch employees (Tirole 1986; Laffont and Rochet 1997). To branch employees collectively, a 
sale is worth more if it is made by a banker than by a cashier because a banker receives a higher 
bonus at the margin. Hence, if a cashier is about to make a sale it is in the interest of both 
bankers and cashiers to exchange a bribe and record the sale as being made by the banker. Such 
bribery is not merely a theoretical possibility; in the past, the bank allowed agents to sell some of 
its products on a commission basis. The bank suspended this practice when it was found that 
agents bribed branch employees into letting them book sales that would have been made anyway. 
The existence of bribery between bankers and other employees would not necessarily 
affect the volume of sales, but it would reduce profitability. More generally, the literature has 
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found that quantity-based incentives tend to have a limited impact on profits because they are too 
expensive (Cappelli and Neumark 2001; Freeman and Kleiner 2005), or because they encourage 
lending to bad risks (Baker 2002; Agarwal and Wang 2009). 
By way of summary, we have four empirical predictions. First, the introduction of 
bankers and advisors and the associated bonus system should lead to an increase in sales 
productivity as it encourages effort and improves matching of employees to jobs. Second, the 
positive effect of bankers and advisors should be higher in large branches because without 
individualized incentives free-riding is more prevalent in those branches. Third, the positive 
impact of bankers and advisors should decline when their number gets too high relative to the 
number of cashiers because cashiers may not provide sufficient service effort to support bankers 
and advisors. Fourth, the impact of the introduction of bankers and advisors on branch-level 
profitability is smaller than the impact on sales because differentiation in incentives encourages 
bribery and because quantity based incentives reduce attention to quality. 
 
IV. Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical approach builds on and extends the insider econometrics literature (Ichniowski 
and Shaw 2003; 2012). This literature has sought to use detailed knowledge of organizations to 
evaluate the impact of HRM policies on performance. While some research on HRM and other 
managerial practices has used experiments (Wageman 1995; Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie 
and Roberts 2013), many researchers have exploited access to data that was collected by firms in 
the course of doing business. Such data are often rich and detailed and they have contributed to 
important insights into the effectiveness of e.g. incentives on performance (Lazear 2000; 
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Freeman and Kleiner 2005). However, the non-experimental nature of the data also has the 
potential to cause endogeneity bias in estimates of the impact of HRM policies on performance. 
To evaluate HRM policies, the researchers have generally relied on models that relate 
output or productivity to firm characteristics and then augmented these models with indicators of 
HRM policies: 
 it it it itXY W        (1) 
In this equation, Y is output or productivity, X is a vector of HRM policies and W is a vector of 
unit characteristics and control variables and ε is a mean zero error term. Estimates of β are 
subject to endogeneity bias if HRM reforms are more likely to be implemented in organizational 
units i that (i) perform systematically better or worse than other units or (ii) where the marginal 
impact of reforms is be higher (Athey and Stern 1998). The first source of endogeneity can be 
differenced out, but the second source cannot, which is most easily illustrated with a 
decomposition of the error term ε in equation (1):  
 it it it i it i itWY XX            (2) 
In equation (2), unit specific performance is represented by μi, which disappears in a fixed effects 
specification so that any bias that arises due to correlation between X and μ disappears. By 
contrast, fixed effects do not eliminate νi, the branch-specific contribution of X to productivity. 
For each unit, the marginal contribution of X to productivity is the average productivity of X, the 
coefficient β, plus the branch specific contribution νi. First differencing leaves νi(Xit – Xit-1) in the 
error term. If the adoption of Xit is optimal, the reform is more likely to be adopted where vi is 
high, so that (Xit – Xit-1) and νi are positively correlated. The result is upward bias in estimates of 
β in both OLS and mean- or first-difference estimates (note that this is exactly what Lazear 
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(2000) shows; he finds that the positive impact of incentives is partially due to self-selection of 
more productive workers into a regime with high-powered incentives). 
In randomized trials the existence of νi is not a problem because randomization eliminates 
correlation between Xit and νi. In non-experimental data, the solution to heterogeneity in the 
benefits of adoption is context specific. For example, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) 
argue that adoption of the HRM policies they test is a function of differences in the cost of 
adoption, not the benefits (i.e. they argue that νi is equal to zero). Athey and Stern (2002) and 
Bartel, Freeman, Ichniowski and Kleiner (2011) show that, in their data, fixed effects eliminate 
all but very implausible sources of bias. There is no basis for such arguments in our empirical 
context and we therefore develop an IV approach that exploits our knowledge of the process that 
led to the adoption of the new HRM policies in the branches of the bank. 
In our data, some branches have more bankers and advisors than others, even if they are 
of the same size. However, all appointments are the result of a policy shock that results from a 
strategic decision at headquarters and is exogenous to all branches. In particular, assume that 
branch i belongs to a group of K branches that are observationally similar because they belong to 
the same size-class or are located in the same region. At any point in time, the number of bankers 
and advisors in all branches k ≠ i, where ,k i K , is representative of the policy impulse coming 
from the bank’s headquarters that branch i receives, but it is uncorrelated with νij, the branch-
specific contribution to productivity of bankers and advisors in branch i. The creation of banker 
and advisor positions in branches k ≠ i is based on sales prospects at these branches, but it does 
not depend on prospects for branch i. Therefore, we can use information on the implementation 
of the reforms in branches k ≠ i as instruments to identify the exogenous component of the 
reforms in (Hausman and Taylor 1981; Hausman 1997; Shirley and Xu 2001). 
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A. Empirical Model 
The principal production factor of the branches in the bank is labor and the function underlying 
our empirical model posits that output is a function of the number of employees in a branch. 
Branch output is measured as the sum of deposits and loans a branch makes, which the branches 
are incentivized to maximize. Following Bartel, Freeman, Ichniowski and Kleiner (2011), we 
call the sum of deposits and loans “footing”.
2
 To facilitate the interpretation of results in terms of 
productivity, we use net sales per employee, ΔFootingijt / FTEijt, as the dependent variable, with 
FTE for Full-Time Equivalent and the indices by i, j and t, stand for branch, region and time. 
 We measure the implementation of reforms as the number of bankers plus advisors in a 
branch divided by the number of employees. Because we anticipate that the impact of bankers 
and advisors on productivity will be higher in large branches and that it will decline as the share 
of bankers and advisors increases, we include the main effect of the reforms in our model along 
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The coefficients of interest are the main effect of the reforms θ1, which we expect to be positive, 
the squared effect of the reforms θ2, which we expect to be negative and the interaction with the 
number of employees θ3, which we expect to be positive.
3
  
                                                 
2
 In the banking literature, footing is aligned with the “production approach” which holds that both lending and 
deposit taking are services that banks provide to their clients and should be counted as outputs (Berger, Hanweck 
and Humphrey 1987). The alternative is the intermediation approach, which claims that banks produce assets use 
deposits as inputs (Sealey and Lindley 1977). The intermediation approach has merit at the bank level, but not at the 
level of the branches since branch lending is not constrained by the availability or cost of deposits. 
3
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We treat the number of bankers and advisors per employee, its square and its interaction 
with the number of employees as endogenous and construct instruments for these variables 
following the approach we sketched above. Specifically, we use the following instruments: the 
average number of employees in branches in the same region, the average number of retail 
bankers in branches in the same size class, the share of branches in the same region with at least 
one SME banker, the share of branches in the same size class with at least one advisor, and a 
categorical variable (ranging from 1 to 4) indicating progress with the rollout of the program that 
introduced the bankers. Hence, for each quarter and for each branch i, our instruments are the 
average branch characteristics calculated across all branches k ≠ i in K where K is defined by 
region or by size class (Table 1).  
In addition to the variables listed in equation (3) we control for demand conditions with 
the municipal unemployment rate and two dummies indicating the size of the municipality in 
which a bank is located (population between 50,000 and 100,000, or population > 100,000; the 
capital, which is the largest city in the country, is a separate region in the bank’s organization). In 
addition, we include a dummy that is equal to 1 when a branch manager has participated in the 
Leadership Academy and 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for time and location with a full set of 
region × time fixed effects. 
 We estimate our models in Stata using GMM, implemented with the ivreg2 command 
(Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2007). We report Hansen’s J-test to show that the instruments can 
be omitted from the main equation,
4
 and first-stage F-tests and the Kleibergen-Paap test to check 
that the first-stage regressions do not suffer from underidentification. 
 
                                                 
4
 The null hypothesis of the J-test is that the excluded instruments have no explanatory power in the main equation. 




In Table 2 we report the estimated coefficients from the baseline model using both OLS and 
GMM estimation. The difference between the two GMM estimates is that the model in column 2 
treats only Bankers + Advisors / FTE, its square and Bankers + Advisors as endogenous whereas 
the model in column 3 also treats FTE and its square as endogenous. The estimations generate 
several interesting results. First, the main effect of (Bankers + Advisors) / FTE is positive. The 
coefficient is larger in the GMM estimates (column 2 and 3) than in the OLS estimates (column 
1). Endogeneity causes a downward bias in the OLS estimates, suggesting that bankers and 
advisors were assigned to branches that initially had relatively low productivity. Second, in the 
GMM estimates, the coefficient on the squared term is significantly negative. This implies that 
the relationship between the ratio of bankers and advisors to FTE and sales productivity is 
concave as predicted (the inflection point lies around 0.15). Third, recall that Bankers + Advisors 
is equal to ((Bankers + Advisors) / FTE) × FTE (footnote 3). The positive coefficient on Bankers 
+ Advisors therefore implies that the impact of the HRM reforms is higher for large branches 
than for small ones. At the same time, the negative coefficient on FTE implies that sales 
productivity is lower in large branches on average. Together, these results are consistent with the 
prediction that free riding under group incentives is more problematic in larger groups (in large 
branches individual incentives "solve" a bigger problem). 
 Considering that the marginal contribution of bankers and advisors to sales productivity 
depends on branch size, we calculate point estimates of this contribution for each of the 
branches.  The GMM estimates in column 2 yield positive and significant marginal contribution 
in about 55 percent of the observations. It is negative and significant in fewer than 20 percent of 
the observations from branches that have a relatively high number of bankers and advisors per 
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employee. On average, the marginal contribution is about one-and-a-half standard deviations of 
the quarterly increase in footing per employee. Hence, although some branches appear to have 
too many bankers and advisors, their overall contribution to sales productivity is positive.  
 The first-stage F-tests suggest that the instruments are sufficiently strong and the J-test 
implies that the omitted instruments have no explanatory power in the main regression. 
Furthermore, a "Difference-in-J" test suggests that the GMM regression in column 2 is 
significantly different from the OLS regression and that the ratio of bankers and advisors to 
employees should be treated as endogenous. In contrast, using the same test, there is no evidence 
that the regression in column 3, which treated FTE and its square as endogenous, is different 
from the one in column 2. Although we should not interpret this as evidence that FTE is 
exogenous, we use the specification in column 2 as our baseline regression.  
In unreported regressions, we also estimate a model without the squared and interaction 
terms and we find that the full specification in Table 2 fits the data better. Also, we estimate a 
model that includes operational expenses at the branch level in addition to the number of 
employees as a control variable. This model produces almost identical results. 
 
A. Additional evidence 
Building on the result that giving a subset of branch employees high-powered incentives raises 
sales, we perform additional analysis to ascertain the robustness of our findings. We estimate the 
model while excluding the regions one-by-one to ensure that none of the regions or branches 
dominates the results.
5
 None does. Similarly, we estimate the model with the years eliminated 
one-by-one. Again, the results are robust. We also estimate a model in which we include the 
                                                 
 
5
 In some of the regressions, the coefficient on Bankers + Advisors is not significant at conventional levels. 
However, the p-value is generally close to 10%, just like the p-value in Table 2. 
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members of the banker teams (assistants and managers) in the count of employees with high-
powered incentives. Over the course of our sample period, banker teams were formalized in the 
branch organization and the incentives for the members became more closely aligned with those 
of the bankers. Again, the results remain unchanged. Finally, if there is positive correlation 
between Bankers + Advisors and branch-specific productivity of bankers and advisors, vi in 
equation (2), there is, in theory, some negative correlation between the instrumental variables 
and branch-specific productivity. The validity of our instrumental variables is based on the 
assumption that the sample is large enough to ignore this correlation. Hansen's J-test suggests 
this is so. As another check, we estimate our model with the Jackknife Instrumental Variables 
Estimator (JIVE, Angrist, Imbens and Krueger 1999). To eliminate correlation between vij and 
the instrumented variables in the first stage, JIVE excludes both the instrumental and 
instrumented variable for observation i from the estimation of the first-stage equation for 
observation i. The JIVE estimates are almost identical to those in Table 2. 
 
B. Profitability and Quality 
We anticipate that the introduction of bankers and advisors and quantity-based incentives will 
have a smaller impact on profitability than on sales volume and that it may also affect indicators 
of quality such as the volume of bad loans and loan-loss provisions. In addition, we investigate 
whether the reforms affect the product mix. Bankers and advisors were expected to raise sales of 
mortgages and contractual savings products with the aim to tie clients to the bank long term. 
Regression results are reported in Table 3. In columns 1 and 3 of the table, we find that 
bankers and advisors contributed to higher sales per employee of mortgages and mutual fund 
type products (due to data availability, the regressions in columns 1 to 4 only cover the years 
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2005 to 2007). However, this did not translate into a larger share of these products in loans and 
deposits outstanding (columns 2 and 4). In columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, we investigate the impact 
of the reforms on loan quality. In large branches, there is a positive relationship between the 
number of bankers and advisors and the growth of bad debts in the portfolio. However, this 
effect is small and there is no relationship between the level of loan-loss provisions and bankers 
and advisors. In column 7 and 8, finally, we investigate whether the reforms have an impact on 
branch-level profitability. There is no evidence that it does. It appears that any increase in sales 
productivity that bankers and advisors provide comes at a significant cost. In 2007, the bank 
decided to reduce the number of advisors in small branches because it felt this cost was too high. 
  
VI. Generalized Propensity Score Estimation 
The results so far show that the introduction of bankers and advisors had a positive impact on 
sales productivity, but did not improve profits or other indicators of “quality”. These results are 
based on an IV strategy and within the IV framework the results are very robust. However, the 
method itself has a weakness in its approach to eliminating endogeneity bias. In particular, IV 
estimates compare observations with a high expected level of treatment (a high ratio of bankers 
and advisors to employees) to observations with low expected treatment, but ignore actual 
treatment levels (Blundell and Costa Dias 2009). As a result, estimates of treatment effects could 
still be biased by systematic differences between branches that are correlated with both the level 
of treatment and its expected impact. Arguably, this concern is especially relevant in our context 
where we construct instruments based on groupings of branches within regions and by size. 
In order to further test the robustness of our results, we therefore use a GPS estimator, 
which compares branches with the same expected treatment but different actual treatment 
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(Imbens 2000; Hirano and Imbens 2004; Imai and van Dyk 2004). The GPS estimator is similar 
in spirit to propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) and its objective is to 
eliminate bias that is due to observable differences between treated units from treatment effects 
estimation. However, unlike propensity score matching, the GPS estimator can be applied to 
multi-valued or continuous treatments such as the ratio of bankers and advisors per employee. 
Our implementation of the GPS estimator, which follows (Hirano and Imbens 2004) is sketched 
out below; Appendix B has a more detailed discussion.  
 There are two key differences between the IV and GPS estimators. First, GPS estimation 
involves an explicit before-after comparison. We exploit this to identify separately the 
performance impact of bankers and that of advisors and delineate two reform periods: (i) the 
introduction of the bankers in the first four quarters (2003) and (ii) the introduction of the 
advisors between quarters 11 and 15 (2005/6).
6
 In both cases, we generate difference-in-
difference estimates that compare branch performance at the beginning of the reform period to 
branch performance about a year after the reforms were introduced.  The second distinction 
between the IV and the GPS estimates is that the former represent a parametric relationship 
between treatment and productivity while the latter represent a dose response function: semi-
parametric estimates of the impact of treatment on performance at a range of treatment levels. 
 The first set of GPS estimates in Panel A of Table 4 compare the sales productivity of the 
bank's branches in quarters 7 to 10 to sales productivity in quarters 1 to 4. To arrive at these 
estimates, we first estimate the propensity for treatment of each branch as a function of branch 
characteristics in quarters 1 to 4 on the basis of a fractional logit model (Papke and Wooldridge 
1996 , see Table A2.1). Using these estimates, we calculate for each branch the predicted sales 
                                                 
6
 In the IV estimation, we cannot separately include bankers and advisors in the same estimation because eventually, 
increasing the number of instruments causes multicollinearity in the instrument matrix. 
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productivity at a range of treatment levels t, conditional on the propensity score at t. The dose 
response function represents the average over all branches of the predicted sales productivity at t  
(Appendix B and Hirano and Imbens 2004). The estimate of the treatment effect is calculated as 
the dose response at t minus the dose response at a baseline level, t = 0 in our case. 
The left-most coefficient in Panel A of Table 4 is a difference-in-difference estimate of 
the impact of an increase in the number of bankers per employee from zero to 5 percent. The first 
difference is that between performance in quarters 7 to 10 and performance in quarters 1 to 4, the 
second difference is that between no treatment and treatment at 5 percent. The other estimates in 
Table 4 show the dose response function over the range of 10 to 35 percent, which is about the 
highest observed percentage of bankers per employee in the data. 
Despite the fact that our estimates are based on a difference-in-difference specification, 
the results are broadly consistent with those of the IV approach. The impact of bankers on sales 
productivity is positive as long as more than 20 percent of branch employees are bankers. At that 
level, the contribution of bankers to sales productivity is the equivalent of about 2 standard 
deviations. In Panel B of Table 4 we report estimates of the effect of advisors on sales 
productivity. In this case, we estimate the propensity for treatment in quarter 15 on the basis of 
branch characteristics in quarters 9 to 12 (Table A2.1). Using the propensities to estimate 
treatment effects in Table 4, we find a negative relationship between sales performance and the 
introduction of advisors. 
 
A. Balancing and Common Support 
The literature on propensity score matching has developed tools to evaluate bias reduction 
characteristics and common support conditions. The toolbox for GPS estimation is still under 
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development, but we build on Hirano and Imbens (2004) and Imai and Van Dyk (2004) to 
analyze bias reduction and on Flores and Mitnik (2013) to derive common support conditions. 
Both tests for bias reduction examine the hypothesis that conditional on the GPS, there is no 
correlation between branch characteristics used to estimate the GPS and the level of treatment. 
Hirano and Imbens (2004) use a blocking approach to test the hypothesis. Table A2.2 analyzes 
the differences in branch characteristics between branches in one tertile of treatment levels (the 
“treated branches”) and branches outside of that tertile. Before conditioning on the propensity 
score (unadjusted difference), 21 out of 51 differences are significant on at least the 5% level of 
significance. After conditioning on the propensity score (adjusted difference), only 8 differences 
are significant at that level and both the differences and the t-statistics tend to shrink. Imai and 
Van Dyk (2004) use a regression-based approach to test for correlation between treatment and 
branch characteristics. Specifically, they compare t-statistics in a series of regressions of branch 
characteristics on (i) the treatment variable and (ii), the treatment variable and the propensity for 
treatment. Figure A2.1 shows that, after we control for the GPS, the distribution of t-statistics on 
the treatment variable is about normal, consistent with the absence of systematic correlation 
between treatment and branch characteristics. 
We next assess the robustness of the GPS estimates to two sets of common support 
conditions on the propensity scores. First, we exclude branches with zero treatment from the 
sample. In preliminary analysis, we found that these branches are quite different from other 
branches, both in terms of “raw” characteristics and in terms of estimated propensity scores. For 
the bankers, the results of this exercise are reported in Table 5. Because branches with zero 
treatment are excluded, the treatment effects are now estimated with 5 percent treatment as a 
benchmark and the first line reports the estimates from Panel A in Table 4 as a reference. Once 
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we exclude branches with zero treatment, the impact of bankers on sales productivity is positive 
across the range and there is a concave relationship between bankers per employee and sales 
productivity, just like in the IV estimates (Panel B in Table 5). 
Second, to impose further common support conditions on the remaining, non-zero 
treatment branches, we adapt a method developed in Flores and Mitnik (2013) for multiple 
discrete treatments to an environment with continuous treatments. The technical details are again 
in Appendix B, but the idea is as follows: we first divide the branches into three tertiles by 
treatment level and calculate the propensity scores for each of the branches at the median level of 
treatment for their tertile. We then calculate the propensity score for the branches in the other 
tertiles, also at the median for the first group. If the propensity score for a branch falls outside of 
the range of scores for the first treatment group, we eliminate the branch from the data. We 
repeat this procedure taking the other two tertiles as the treatment group, so that our final sample 
consists of observations that are in the support of all three treatment groups. 
With these additional conditions, the estimated treatment effects remain significant and 
the relationship between bankers per employee and sales productivity remains concave (Panel C 
of Table 5). Further analysis shows that with the common support conditions imposed, sample 
balance improves, confirming to the validity of the results. 
We also performed balancing tests for the second reform period when the advisor 
position was introduced. The results (reported in Table A2.3 and Figure A2.2) are less 
encouraging than those for the bankers: the number of t-statistics that are significant at the 5% 
level goes down by only two from 13 (unadjusted) to 11 (adjusted) and a number of differences 
move in the wrong direction. In Figure A2.2, the distribution of t-statistics deviates from the 
normal distribution even after we control for the GPS. When we impose common support 
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conditions on this set of estimates, the estimated treatment effects change both in sign and size 
(by an order of magnitude; Table A2.4). However, common support conditions do not improve 
the balancing properties of the GPS estimates and ultimately we cannot pin down a clear 
relationship between the introduction of advisors and sales productivity. 
The results with regard to the introduction of the bankers are consistent with the results 
from the IV regression, but the results for the advisors are not. It is possible that the impact of the 
advisors is simply not robust. To evaluate this, we re-estimated the GMM model in Table 2 with 
Bankers / FTE instead of (Bankers + Advisors) / FTE. The coefficients in Table A2.5 are smaller 
than those in Table 2, but they have similar sign and significance, suggesting that the results in 
Table 2 are driven mostly by bankers. 
Focusing on the introduction of bankers only, we use the GPS approach to also analyze 
the impact of the HRM reforms on profitability and indicators of loan quality in Table 6. The 
estimates show a negative relationship between the ratio of profit to footing and the presence of 
bankers. The effect is relatively small (less than one standard deviation), but at odds with the 
stated goal of the reforms to improve the volume of sales and to attract customers that would be 
more profitable to the bank. The estimates in Table 6 give a mixed picture of loan quality. On the 
one hand, the introduction of bankers is associated with a reduction in loan loss provisions, i.e. of 
expected loan losses. At the same time however, the arrival of bankers is associated with an 
increase in bad debts. Between Table 6 and Table 3, which showed an insignificant relationship 
between profits, loan quality and the introduction of bankers and advisors, there is no evidence 






We exploit an episode of strategic restructuring in a bank – introduction of bankers and advisors 
with strong individual incentives – to study the impact of modern HRM policies in an emerging 
market context. The policies created a new functional structure in the bank’s branches and high-
powered incentives for a subset of branch employees. We find that the reforms have raised the 
sales productivity in the branches, although the effect appears to be driven by bankers only. The 
impact of the reforms is larger in large branches, but declines when the ratio of bankers and 
advisors per employee rises. These results are consistent with the notion that the temptation to 
free ride is strongest in large branches and that there are limits to the ability or motivation of 
cashiers to provide support services to bankers and advisors. 
We find mixed evidence on the relationship between the HRM reforms and indicators of 
quality such as profitability, portfolio composition and loan performance. On the one hand, this 
is good news: despite the fact that the bonus system primarily rewards volume and that the 
differentiation of incentives creates tensions, loan standards have not deteriorated dramatically. 
Other papers find a much more negative relationship between the introduction of sales incentives 
and loan quality (Agarwal and Wang 2009). On the other hand, an important goal of the reforms 
was to promote the sale of mortgages and sophisticated savings products and to tie high-value 
customers to the bank. 
Research on the relationship between bank performance and foreign acquisition has 
found that in emerging markets, foreign acquisition improves bank performance (Claessens, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2001; Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel 2005). The literature has argued 
that foreign owners improve performance by, among other things, introducing modern 
management. Our paper provides concrete evidence in support of this argument. At the same 
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time, the results suggest that there are challenges to the implementation of new HRM policies. 
Our data do not have sufficient detail on the characteristics of branch employees and managers to 
uncover exactly why the reforms failed to improve quality indicators. However, in a study of a 
bonus system that was based on a balanced scorecard, Griffith and Neely (2009) point out that 
inexperienced managers may not be able to balance multiple targets. In the bank, branch 
managers need to maximize sales, while taking care of quality, the product mix and the fact that 
differentiation in incentives creates tension in the system. In interviews, we were told that some 
branch managers found it challenging to control the bankers who essentially sought to run their 
own franchise within the branch. Hence, it is important that HRM policies are designed taking 
into account the ability of managers to deal with any tensions that arise in the system. This is 
especially relevant in emerging markets where managers may not have experience with 
sophisticated incentive systems or where performance measurement may be more difficult than 
in advanced economies. 
 Our IV strategy exploits a unique feature of our data which is that the implementation of 
HRM reforms is the result of a policy initiative at the level of the bank’s headquarters, whereas 
our data are at the branch-level. In most datasets, the decision to implement new HRM policies is 
made at the level where it is implemented. This is true of firm-level studies (Ichniowski, Shaw 
and Prennushi 1997), but also of branch-level studies by (Bartel 2004) and (Bartel, Freeman, 
Ichniowski and Kleiner 2011), who focus on implementation of policies by branch managers. 
Although our data is unique in the sense that headquarters provides a policy shock, other 
research in personnel economics might be able to exploit policy shocks that come from outside 
the firm. For example, cost reductions in information technology could spur the adoption of 
organizational reforms and the same could be true of revisions in certain ISO quality standards. 
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 We use GPS estimation to ascertain the robustness of our IV estimates. This is especially 
useful to test whether our IV results are biased by the fact that there are structural differences 
between branches with a high, or with a low likelihood of adoption of HRM reforms. Compared 
to the IV approach, GPS estimation controls more carefully for observable differences between 
branches and compared to traditional matching estimators GPS estimation allows for multivalued 
(and multidimensional) treatments. In the context of research on HRM reforms this is a useful 
property because it should enable researchers to use GPS estimation to evaluate 






TABLE 1  Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A: Branch Staffing and Labor Productivity, by Year and by Size 





Advisors ΔLoans / FTE 
ΔDeposits / 
FTE 
Profit / FTE 
    FTE % FTE % FTE % FTE Thsnds Thsnds Thsnds 
Large Branches ( 20 employees or more) 
2003 49 34.4 6.0% 7.2% 0.0% 
  
1,404 
2004 48 34.8 10.1% 11.5% 0.0% 2,341 12,265 1,500 
2005 45 34.0 10.0% 12.4% 0.4% 4,593 6,831 1,653 
2006 47 31.6 11.8% 12.2% 9.1% 9,779 12,676 2,077 
2007 43 32.3 12.1% 12.9% 12.0% 10,385 14,674 2,320 
Medium-sized Branches (8 to 20 employees) 
2003 78 11.6 4.4% 1.0% 0.0% 
  
1,221 
2004 77 11.6 9.0% 2.8% 0.0% 1,628 10,732 1,371 
2005 72 12.1 9.5% 3.4% 0.7% 4,482 7,620 1,399 
2006 63 11.9 10.7% 4.0% 14.1% 8,348 12,969 1,934 
2007 64 11.7 10.7% 4.3% 16.0% 12,063 14,277 2,203 
Small Branches (7 employees or fewer) 
2003 55 5.4 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
  
830 
2004 54 5.4 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 1,635 9,472 977 
2005 63 5.6 1.8% 0.0% 0.4% 3,356 4,767 1,156 
2006 70 5.6 4.5% 0.0% 8.9% 8,204 10,938 1,564 
2007 71 5.2 3.8% 0.0% 3.8% 9,537 14,552 2,208 
Panel B: Correlations, by year (number of observations in italics) 





Advisors ΔLoans / FTE 
ΔDeposits / 
FTE 
Profit / FTE 
Retail Bankers 0.402*** 1           
SME Bankers 0.618*** 0.242*** 1         
Advisors 0.030 0.222*** 0.062 1       
ΔLoans / FTE 0.022 0.092** 0.099** 0.282*** 1     
ΔDeposits / FTE 0.076* 0.041 0.048 0.035 0.470*** 1   
Profit / FTE 0.209*** 0.248*** 0.164*** 0.296*** 0.227*** 0.031 1 
   Note: FTE is Full Time Equivalent. ΔLoans / FTE and ΔDeposits / FTE are based on loans and deposits outstanding as 
reported on the balance sheet in local currency at the end of each year. Profit per Employee reflects annual profits per branch 
(branches with less than 4 quarterly observations in a year are excluded from the calculation of median profit). The reported 
figures are median values measured in local currency. The correlations in Panel B are based on yearly averages and exclude 
pre-2005 observations for Advisors and pre-2006 observations for Leadership Academy because Advisors were first 




TABLE 2  Sales (ΔFooting/FTE) and Branch Characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS GMM GMM 
Bankers + Advisors / FTE 0.094 0.374 0.392 
  [0.045]** [0.101]*** [0.116]*** 
Bankers + Advisors / FTE squared -0.193 -1.264 -1.463 
  [0.122] [0.437]*** [0.417]*** 
Bankers + Advisors 0.004 0.010 0.015 
  [0.003] [0.006]* [0.005]*** 
Leadership Academy 0.006 0.012 0.011 
  [0.006] [0.007]* [0.007] 
FTE -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
  [0.001]** [0.001]*** [0.002]** 
FTE Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  [0.000]*** [0.000] [0.000] 
Unemployment rate -0.068 -0.048 -0.052 
  [0.041] [0.037] [0.038] 
Constant 0.083 0.081 0.086 
  [0.018]*** [0.017]*** [0.018]*** 
Observations 3245 3245 3245 
Number of Branches 188 188 188 
IV/GMM diagnostics (p-values)       
Hansen J test   0.656 0.287 
Kleibergen-Paap test for underidentification   0.000 0.000 
Difference-in-J test (endogeneity of instrumented variables)   0.004 0.570 
First Stage F-statistics       
Bankers + Advisors / FTE   84.69 155.50 
Bankers + Advisors / FTE squared   90.35 136.00 
Bankers + Advisors   46.95 235.00 
FTE   0.00 269.10 
FTE Squared   0.00 47.95 
   Note: Footing is the sum of Loans and Deposits. ΔFooting /FTE is the change in footing per employee from quarter t - 1 to 
quarter t. Bankers + Advisors is equal to the number of Retail and SME Bankers and Advisors in a branch. Leadership 
Academy is a dummy that equals 1 when a branch manager has finished the Academy and 0 otherwise. The unemployment 
rate is measured at the level of the administrative district of a branch. In the GMM estimates, instruments for Bankers + 
Advisors/FTE and its square and for Bankers + Advisors (and for FTE and FTE squared in column 3) are constructed from 
the number of bankers, advisors and employees in other branches in the same region or the same size class (see table 1 for 
size classes). In particular, the instruments are the average number of employees in the same region, the average number of 
retail bankers in the same size class, the share of branches in the same region with at least one SME banker, the share of 
branches in the same size class with at least one advisor , the average number of retail bankers in branches in the same size 
class in 2003 to 2005 (in columns 3). The instruments also include a categorical variable identifying the phases in the rollout 
of the program that introduced the banker positions. All models include region x quarter x year fixed effects and city/town 
dummies for branches located in towns with 50,000 to 100,000 people or cities with more than 100,000 people. Robust 




TABLE 3 The Quality of Sales and Branch Characteristics 




Δ Mortgage / 
Loans 
Δ Funds /     
FTE 
Δ Funds / 
Deposits 
Δ Profit /     
FTE 
Δ Profit / 
Footing 
Δ Bad Debts / 
Footing 
Δ Provisions / 
Footing 
Bankers + Advisors / FTE 0.058 -0.059 0.274 -0.072 -0.003 0.000 0.006 -0.012 
  [0.025]** [0.160] [0.087]*** [0.087] [0.002] [0.037] [0.014] [0.022] 
Bankers + Advisors / FTE squared -0.215 0.012 -0.932 0.249 0.011 -0.035 -0.073 0.046 
  [0.100]** [0.648] [0.333]*** [0.340] [0.012] [0.141] [0.058] [0.096] 
Bankers + Advisors 0.002 0.002 0.010 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 
  [0.001]* [0.009] [0.004]** [0.004] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001]** [0.001] 
Constant 0.018 0.040 0.013 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.000 
  [0.003]*** [0.012]*** [0.006]** [0.007] [0.000] [0.005] [0.003] [0.002] 
Observations 2574 2578 2574 2578 3245 3247 3248 3247 
Number of Branches 187 187 187 187 188 188 188 188 
IV/GMM diagnostics (p-values)                 
Hansen J test 0.122 0.774 0.008 0.022 0.459 0.398 0.472 0.432 
Kleibergen-Paap test for underidentification 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   Note: Bankers + Advisors is equal to the number of Retail and SME Bankers and Advisors in a branch. FTE is the number of employees in a branch. All 
estimates are done by GMM. Bankers + Advisors, Bankers + Advisors / FTE and its square are treated as endogenous. Instruments for Bankers + Advisors / 
FTE, its square and Bankers + Advisors are constructed on the basis of the presence of bankers, advisors and employees for other branches in the same region 
or the same size class (see table 1 for size classes). In particular, the instruments are the average number of employees in the same region, the average number 
of retail bankers in the same size class, the share of branches in the same region with at least one SME banker in the same region, the share of branches with at 
least one advisor in the same size class. In addition, the instruments include a categorical variable identifying the phases in the rollout of the program that 
introduced the banker positions. All models include a dummy that is equal to 1 if the branch manager has taken the leadership academy, FTE, FTE squared, the 
unemployment rate at the district level, region x quarter x year fixed effects and city/town dummies for branches located in towns with 50,000 to 100,000 
people or cities with more than 100,000 people. Robust standard errors, clustered by branch, in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 






TABLE 4 Bankers and Advisors and Sales Per Employee - Generalized Propensity Score Estimates 
Panel A: Bankers / FTE 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 
ΔFooting / FTE -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 0.015 0.037 0.060 0.083 
  [0.002]* [0.004]* [0.004] [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** 
Observations 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 
Panel B: Advisors / FTE 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%     
ΔFooting / FTE -0.006 -0.011 -0.019 -0.027 -0.028     
  [0.004] [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]***     
Observations 178 178 178 178 178     
   Note: The numbers in this table are estimates of the impact of having a certain share of bankers (advisors) per branch employee 
(with percentage shares ordered by column) on sales per employee in a branch. The estimates represent difference-in-difference 
estimates of the dose-response function at various ratios of bankers (advisors) to employees. The first difference is the difference in 
sales per employee between branches with zero percent bankers per employee and branches with a higher share of bankers per 
employee and the second difference is between sales per employee in quarters 7 to 10 and sales per employee in quarters 1 to 4 
(quarters 17 to 20 minus quarters 9 to 12 for the advisors in panel B). See text and Appendix B for further details. Standard errors are 






TABLE 5 Bankers and Sales Per Employee - Generalized Propensity Score Estimates 
Bankers / FTE 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 
Panel A: Baseline Estimates (Table 4)           
ΔFooting / FTE -0.003 0.003 0.019 0.041 0.064 0.087 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** 
Observations 167 167 167 167 167 167 
Panel B: Excluding observations with zero treatment         
ΔFooting / FTE 0.015 0.038 0.058 0.069 0.066 0.049 
  [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 
Panel C: Excluding observations with zero treatment and with overlap conditions imposed   
ΔFooting / FTE 0.022 0.040 0.051 0.051 0.042 0.027 
  [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 
   Note: The numbers in this table are estimates of the impact of having a certain share of bankers per branch employee (with 
percentage shares ordered by column) on sales per employee in a branch. The estimates represent difference-in-difference 
estimates of the dose-response function at various ratios of bankers to employees. The first difference is the difference in sales 
per employee between branches with 5 percent bankers per employee and branches with a higher share of bankers per employee 
and the second difference is between sales per employee in Quarters 7 to 10 and sales per employee in quarters  1 to 4. The first 
set of estimates is from Table 4. In the second set of estimates, the observations with zero bankers were eliminated. For the third 
set of estimates, the branches with non-zero treatment were divided into tertiles based on their treatment level. Branches outside 
of each treatment group are eliminated from the sample if their propensity score at the median treatment in the treatment group 
is less than the propensity score at the second percentile of propensity scores in the treatment group. See Appendix B for details. 





  TABLE 6 Bankers and Performance - Generalized Propensity Score Estimates 
Bankers / FTE in Quarters 7 to 10 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 
Profit per Employee 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Provision / Loans 0.000 -0.006 -0.015 -0.024 -0.030 -0.034 -0.035 
  [0.000] [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Bad Loans / Loans 0.000 0.007 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.013 
  [0.000] [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** 
Observations 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 
   Note: The numbers in this table are estimates of the impact of having a certain share of bankers per branch employee (with percentage 
shares ordered by column) on profit per employee and on loan loss provisions and bad loans as a percentage of loans in a branch. The 
estimates reflect the average impact over quarters 7 to 10e. The estimates represent difference-in-difference estimates of the dose-response 
function at various ratios of bankers to employees. The first difference is the difference in sales per employee between branches with zero 
percent bankers per employee and branches with a higher share of bankers per employee and the second difference is between performance 
in quarters 7 to 10 and performance the base period (quarters 1 to 4). See Appendix B for details. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 




FIGURE 1 Old and New Branch Organizational Models 
 












































Arrow Indicates hierarchical relationship 




FIGURE 2  Bonus System  
 
   Note: bankers’ and advisors' final bonus is a 70/30 weighted average of personal and branch performance. All other 
non-managerial staff receive a bonus based on branch performance. 
bankers 
advisors & other 
branch staff 












Estimating treatment effects using the generalized propensity score 
The generalized propensity score (GPS) itself and its use in estimating the effect of continuous 
treatments are developed in Imbens (2000), Hirano and Imbens (2004) and Imai and van Dyk 
(2004). Our empirical implementation primarily follows Hirano and Imbens (2004). 
 If we define the treatment (bankers or advisors per employee) as a variable t Tò , the GPS 
is the density of t conditional on a vector of branch characteristics X. By definition, treatment is 
independent of X after we condition on the propensity score. The use of the GPS in treatment 
effects estimation is then justified by the "weak unconfoundedness assumption" (Hirano and 
Imbens 2004). Specifically, the assumption is that at any t Tò the effect of treatment on the 
outcome (sales productivity in our case) does not depend on the actual treatment received 
conditional on X: 
 ( ) |Y t T X t T    (A2.1) 
If this is true, Hirano and Imbens show, conditioning on the GPS is sufficient to remove any bias 
associated with differences in branch characteristics X (Imai and Van Dyk (2004), use a slightly 
different approach to come to essentially the same conclusion). 
 Hirano and Imbens (2004) suggest a three-step approach to estimate treatment effects 
using the GPS. The first step is to estimate the propensity for treatment conditional on X. In the 
second step, the conditional expectation of the outcome Yi is modeled as a function of the 
estimated propensity score ri (ti, Xi) and actual treatment ti. The third and final step is to estimate 
the potential outcomes, Yi (r(t, Xi), t) at hypothetical treatment levels t on the basis of the 
estimated relationship between Y, R and T. In and of themselves, the estimates Yi (r(t, Xi), t) have 




a unique sub-population (in this respect the GPS for multi-valued treatments is different from the 
GPS for binary treatments, see Imbens 2000). In particular, we cannot compare E[Y(s) | r(s, X) = 
r] to E[Y(t) | r(t, X) = r] because r(s, X) = r and r(t, X) = r represent different sub-populations in 
the data. By the same logic however, we can compare E[Y(s)] and E[Y(t)], the population 
averages of E[Y(s) | r(s, X)] and E[Y(t) | r(t, X)], because both of these expected values are based 
on the same population. Consequently, we can obtain a dose-response function Y(t) by 
calculating the sample average of Yi (r(t, Xi), t) at a series of potential treatments t. Treatment 
effects are calculated as the difference between Y(t) and the dose-response at a baseline treatment 
such as Y(0). 
 
A. Implementation 
We identify two treatment periods in our data. The first covers the introduction of the bankers in 
quarters 1 to 4 and the second the introduction of the advisors in quarters 11 to 15 (figure 3). 
Treatment is measured as the number of bankers or advisors per employee in a branch. This 
varies between zero and about 0.35 for the bankers and between zero and 0.25 for the advisors. 
Because our treatment variable is a fraction, we use a fractional logit model (Papke and 
Wooldridge 1996) to estimate the propensity score. For the first treatment period, we calculate 
branch characteristics in X on the basis of data from the first four quarters. Specifically, we 
estimate: 
 
,, ,( ,Δ ,Δ
, , )
ijt Size Footing FTE Footing FTE
Unemployment rate
f FTE FTEij ij ij ij ij ij ij
city regionij ij j

 (A2.2) 
All variables were calculated as averages over the first four quarters, except for cityij  and regionij 




In estimating (A2.2), we allow the coefficient on FTE to vary between branch size groups to 
allow for non-linearities in the equation. The results of this first step are reported in Table A2.1. 
The second step is to estimate the expected outcome conditional on the propensity score 
and the level of treatment for each branch. In order to do this, we calculate the estimated 
propensity for treatment for each branch îjr at the observed level of treatment tij using the 
estimates in Table A2.1. Following Hirano and Imbens (2004), we then estimate the following 
quadratic equation: 
 2 21 2 3 4 5ˆ ˆ ˆ)Δ ) )( ( (ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ijα β t β t β r β r β tY t t tr       (A2.3) 
The dependent variable in this equation, ΔY, is the difference between ΔFootingij /FTEij over 
quarters 1 to 4 and ΔFootingij /FTEij over quarters 7 to 10. As discussed above, the coefficients 
in this equation do not have a causal interpretation because a given level r of R does not identify 
a unique sub-population. 
In the third and final step, the coefficients are used to calculate the estimated outcome at 
each level of treatment and the treatment effects. In particular, we calculate, for each level of 
treatment and each branch:  
 2 21 2 3 4 5Y ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ij ij ijij t r r rt t t t t t                 (A2.4) 
 Finally, we use the estimates of outcomes ΔYij(t) for each branch from equation (A2.4) to 
calculate the estimate of the dose response function at t: 
  
1
(ˆ Δ ( ) Δ )ij
i
E Y t Y
N
t   (A2.5) 
The left-hand side of equation (A2.5) represents the expected increase in ΔFootingij /FTEij 





    00 ˆ ˆ( ) (Y )Y 0t E t E Y      (A2.6) 
Where  0Yt is a difference-in-difference estimate of the increase in performance associated 
with an increase in the ratio of bankers to employees from 0 to t. The standard errors for the 
expected performance  ˆ Y( )E t and the treatment effect need to be corrected for the fact that 
they are based on estimated propensity scores. Following Hirano and Imbens, we report 
bootstrapped errors. 
 The calculation of treatment effects for the introduction of the advisor function follows 
the same approach as that for the introduction of the banker function. In this case, quarters 9 to 
12 are the base period and quarters 17 to 20 are the period in which outcomes are measured. 
Also, first-step estimation of the propensity score includes the ratio of bankers to FTE. The 
results of this first-step estimation are displayed in Table A2.1. 
 
B. Balancing and Common Support 
The rationale for matching (with binary treatments) and GPS estimation (with multi-valued 
treatments) is that the propensity score can improve the balance of the sample. However, the 
GPS is not guaranteed to improve the balance and it is important to assess the extent to which an 
improvement in balance is indeed achieved. In addition, the estimation of treatment effects 
requires that there is overlap (or a common support) in the likelihood that branches receive 
treatment t regardless of whether they actually receive t or some other treatment s (Flores and 
Mitnik 2013). There are no fully agreed upon methods for the evaluation of balancing properties 
or the extent of overlap in the context of multi-valued treatments. However, we use methods 




we adapt the method for discrete treatments in Flores and Mitnik (2013) to continuous treatments 
to evaluate the extent to which there is common support. 
 
Balancing tests. In order to ascertain the balancing properties of the propensity score estimation, 
we implement two tests. The first one follows Hirano and Imbens (2004) and involves 
partitioning the observations according to treatment status and propensity scores. The second test 
follows Imai and Van Dyk (2004) and involves regressing the branch characteristics on the 
treatment variable with and without the propensity score. In both cases, we test the assumption 
that, conditional on the propensity score, there are no meaningful differences between branches 
according to their level of treatment. 
Beginning with the first treatment period and following Hirano and Imbens (2004), we 
divide the branches into three treatment groups of about equal size: a group of branches with no 
bankers (58 branches), a group of branches with between zero and 0.17 bankers per employee 
(55) and a group of branches with between 0.17 and 0.36 bankers per employee (54). For each of 
these groups and each of the branch characteristics we first test whether the branch 
characteristics in the treatment group are significantly different from the characteristics in the 
other groups.  The t-statistics for this test are reported in Table A2.2, columns 1, 3 and 5. The 
table shows that there are significant differences between treatment groups, in particular 
according to size and productivity. 
In order to check whether the propensity score improves the balance in the sample, we 
estimate, for each treatment group, the propensity score at the median of the range of treatments 
in the group (0 in the case of the first group) and divide the observations in each group into 




same treatment level and assign the observations to the quintiles of the first group according to 
their propensity score (i.e. if the first group is the treatment group, we calculate the propensity 
score for branches in the other two groups at t = 0 and if a propensity score falls within one of 




If branch characteristics are independent of treatment status conditional on the propensity 
score, the branches within each quintile should be similar to each other regardless of treatment 
levels. To test whether this is true, we calculate the difference in branch characteristics between 
branches in the treatment group and those outside of the treatment group for each quintile. We 
then take observation-weighted averages of each difference across the quintiles and calculate a t-
statistic to assess whether the difference is significantly different from zero. The results for the 
first treatment period are displayed in Table A2.2 and those for the second period are displayed 
in Table A2.3. For the first treatment period, the propensity score delivers a significant 
improvement in balance. In the "raw" data, 21 out of 51 t-statistics were higher than 1.96. After 
adjusting for the propensity score, only 7 are (compare columns 2, 4 and 6 to the "adjusted" t-
statistics in columns 1, 3 and 5). For the second treatment period, the number of t-statistics 
higher than 1.96 drops from 14 before to 11 after taking into account the propensity score (out of 
a total of 54 this time; see Table A2.3, with the same column comparisons as above). 
The risk of relying on t-tests to assess balancing is that a drop in significance of 
differences may be due to an increase in variance rather than a decrease in actual differences 
between observations in the treated and non-treated groups. However, comparison of the 
unadjusted and adjusted differences in Tables A2.2 shows that the adjusted differences tend to be 
smaller than the unadjusted ones. Unfortunately, this does not apply in Table A2.3. 
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The second set of balancing tests is based on Imai and Van Dyk (2004). It also seeks to 
ascertain that, conditional on the propensity score, branch characteristics and treatment are 
uncorrelated. Instead of partitioning the data into broad treatment groups, Imai and Van Dyk use 
a regression-based approach that evaluates differences in the covariates along their support in the 
data. Following their example, we run two series of regressions. The first series are regressions 
of the branch characteristics used in the estimation of the GPS on the treatment variable (using 
linear regressions for continuous characteristics and logit regressions for binary variables
10
). The 
second series are the same regressions, but including the GPS in addition to the treatment 
variable. If the GPS properly balances the sample, its inclusion should render the treatment 
insignificant. Figure A2.1 presents the results for the first treatment period. The figure plots the 
quantiles of the t-statistics on the treatment variable (Bankers / FTE) against the quantiles of the 
normal distribution. The GPS clearly improves the balance and brings the distribution of t-
statistics much closer to the normal distribution. 
Figure A2.2 repeats the exercise for the second treatment period, with Advisors / FTE as 
the treatment variable. In this case, including the GPS in the regressions slightly narrows the 
distribution of t-statistics but much less so than in the first reform period. This reinforces the 
conclusion from Table A3 that the GPS does little to improve sample balance in the second 
reform period. 
 
Common Support. In binary treatment models, the efficacy of matching estimators in reducing 
bias is contingent on the presence of a common support for propensity scores between treated 
and non-treated individuals (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997). Definition of common support 
is more complicated in the case of multi-valued treatments because the propensity score for each 
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individual has to be evaluated at multiple treatment values against the propensity score of 
individuals receiving a particular level of treatment (Flores and Mitnik 2013). 
Our approach to evaluating the role of a common support is to assess the robustness of 
our estimates to the imposition of more stringent common support conditions. We do this in two 
steps. First, we exclude observations that receive zero treatment (i.e. zero bankers or zero 
advisors). Analysis of the propensity scores at t = 0 revealed that branches with zero treatment 
are extremely likely to receive no treatment, but that the propensity of other branches to receive 
zero treatment is very low. Conversely, the propensities of zero treatment branches to receive 
non-zero treatment are lower than of almost any of the branches that receive non-zero treatment. 
Second, after excluding the branches with zero treatment, we adapt the method developed 
in Flores and Mitnik (2013) to impose commonality of support among branches with non-zero 
treatment. Flores and Mitnik (2013) have data with discrete treatments. To ensure that there is 
overlap in the support between observations, they calculate the propensity score for each 
observation at each treatment    . At each t, they calculate a cutoff value qt, which is defined 
as the second percentile of the distribution of propensity scores among the individuals receiving 
t. Subsequently, they calculate the propensity for other individuals to receive treatment t. 
Individuals are excluded from the sample if their propensity score at any t is lower than qt. 
We adapt this procedure to continuous treatments by dividing the branches with non-zero 
treatment into tertiles on the basis of their treatment. Starting with the first tertile, we calculate 
the propensity score for treatment at the median of this treatment group, m1. We then determine 
the propensity score at the second percentile of the treatment group q1 and for the second and 
third tertiles we use a similar procedure to calculate m2, q2 and m3, q3. Finally, we exclude all 




and we similarly exclude branches that have no common support with the branches in the second 
and third tertiles. 
We assess the extent to which our estimates are robust to the imposition of stricter 
conditions for common support in Table 5 (main text, for the bankers) and Table A2.4 (for the 
advisors). Because we exclude branches with non-zero treatment, we use t = 5% as our new 
baseline treatment (hence, the estimated treatment effects in Tables 5 and A2.4 represent
   5 ˆ ˆ( )Y Y (5)t E t E Y     ). For ease of reference, we have included the comparable 
estimates from Table 4 in Tables 5 and A2.4. The results in Table 5 suggest that the estimates for 
the bankers in Panel A of Table 4 largely hold up when we impose a common support. The 
estimated effects remain positive and they are of similar magnitude although they are somewhat 
higher at low levels of treatment and reveal diminishing returns at higher levels of treatment.  
Further analysis of these results reveals that the restriction of the sample also improves the 
balance (both before and after controlling for the GPS). 
The results in Table A2.4 by contrast are more mixed. After imposing common support 
conditions, the sign of the estimated treatment effects changes. However, it is not clear that the 
estimates with the common support conditions are more reliable than the estimates without those 
conditions: the sample balance does not improve after imposing these conditions and conditional 
on the GPS it may even get worse. Hence, the GPS estimates do not give us solid evidence that 
the introduction of the advisors improved branch performance, but they confirm that the 





TABLE A2.1  Propensity score estimation (fractional logit) 
  (1)   (2) 
  Bankers / FTE   Advisors / FTE 
FTE -0.008 [0.003]**   -0.015 [0.004]*** 
FTE x Size (8 to 20 employees) 0.080 [0.021]***   0.012 [0.013] 
FTE x Size (20 employees or more) 1.511 [0.608]**   0.383 [0.088]*** 
ΔFTE 0.211 [0.107]**   0.110 [0.434] 
Bankers and Advisors / FTE       -1.511 [0.664]** 
Bankers and Advisors  / FTE x Size (8 to 20 employees)       0.624 [0.985] 
Bankers and Advisors / FTE x Size (20 employees or more)       -0.236 [1.691] 
Size (8 to 20 employees) -1.651 [0.297]***   -0.083 [0.252] 
Size (20 employees or more) -12.546 [4.293]***   -2.853 [0.633]*** 
Footing / FTE 1.088 [0.317]***   0.325 [0.223] 
ΔFooting / FTE 0.116 [0.639]   -1.854 [1.424] 
Unemployment rate 0.405 [1.829]   -1.565 [1.789] 
Population 0 to 50,000 0.241 [0.142]*   -0.131 [0.095] 
Population 50,000 to 100,000 0.158 [0.132]   -0.161 [0.098] 
Region 1 -0.114 [0.255]   0.293 [0.145]** 
Region 2 0.150 [0.262]   -0.082 [0.179] 
Region 3 -0.064 [0.178]   0.347 [0.198]* 
Region 4 -0.060 [0.218]   0.028 [0.145] 
Region 5 0.053 [0.175]   0.114 [0.173] 
Region 6 0.269 [0.205]       
Region 7 0.008 [0.201]   -1.050 [0.332]*** 
Observations 167     175   
   Note: The dependent variables are Bankers / FTE in quarter 7 (column 1) and Advisors / FTE in quarter 
15 (columns 2). Robust standard errors in brackets. * significantly different from 0 at 10%; ** significant 





TABLE A2.2  Balancing tests (table 4, Panel A) 
treatment group Bankers / FTE = 0   Bankers / FTE = 0.061 to 0.167   Bankers / FTE = 0.170 to 0.353 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
  
Unadjusted 
difference t-test   
Adjusted 
difference t-test   
Unadjusted 
difference t-test   
Adjusted 
difference t-test   
Unadjusted 
difference t-test   
Adjusted 
difference t-test 
FTE 15.942 7.53   1.010 2.11   4.518 1.84   8.001 2.20   -21.077 -11.20   -9.415 -2.63 
ΔFTE 0.040 0.71   -0.036 -1.85   0.009 0.15   0.100 1.20   -0.050 -0.88   -0.062 -0.53 
Size (8 to 20 employees) 0.387 5.16   0.042 0.24   -0.586 -8.62   -0.268 -2.87   0.190 2.35   0.310 3.10 
Size (20 employees or more) -0.782 -17.10   -0.042 -0.24   0.338 4.66   -0.028 -0.39   0.469 6.87   0.031 0.84 
Footing 0.279 7.90   0.097 1.33   -0.053 -1.28   -0.018 -0.31   -0.235 -6.18   -0.095 -1.49 
ΔFooting -0.004 -0.39   0.014 1.47   -0.024 -2.53   -0.031 -1.74   0.028 2.96   0.036 2.03 
Unemployment rate -0.017 -2.28   -0.001 -0.05   0.005 0.60   0.014 1.32   0.013 1.70   0.003 0.31 
Population 50,000 to 100,000 0.202 3.81   0.000     0.007 0.12   0.091 1.01   -0.216 -4.02   -0.025 -0.28 
Population > 100,000 0.324 4.81   0.125 1.24   -0.176 -2.46   -0.280 -2.69   -0.158 -2.19   0.029 0.24 
Region 1 0.043 0.79   0.167 1.00   -0.075 -1.34   0.008 0.09   0.030 0.54   0.071 0.76 
Region 2 -0.012 -0.24   -0.042 -0.24   0.034 0.71   0.050 0.75   -0.023 -0.46   -0.058 -0.73 
Region 3 -0.123 -2.18   0.042 0.29   0.079 1.36   0.079 1.03   0.048 0.83   -0.015 -0.27 
Region 4 -0.007 -0.12   -0.042 -0.24   -0.021 -0.34   -0.002 -0.02   0.029 0.46   0.075 0.79 
Region 5 -0.063 -1.23   0.083 0.44   0.007 0.13   -0.038 -0.55   0.059 1.11   -0.012 -0.17 
Region 6 0.166 3.16   0.042 0.29   -0.029 -0.54   -0.002 -0.03   -0.143 -2.64   -0.158 -1.55 
Region 7 0.041 0.86   -0.083 -0.81   -0.020 -0.41   -0.154 -2.12   -0.023 -0.46   0.066 0.80 
Region 8 -0.045 -0.83   -0.167 -1.20   0.025 0.45   0.059 0.83   0.022 0.39   0.031 0.38 
   Note: This table reports improvements in the balance of the sample (used in Table 4) after controlling for the Generalized Propensity Score. In order to implement the balancing 
tests, the sample was split in tertiles on the basis of treatment levels. The "unadjusted difference" represents the difference in averages of the covariates between branches in a 
given tertile of treatments (the "treated" branches) and branches outside of the tertile. To calculate the "adjusted difference", the generalized propensity scores of all observations 
in a given tertile of treatments were split into quintiles. Subsequently, based on their propensity scores, the non-treated branches are are assigned to the quintiles. The adjusted 





TABLE A2.3  Balancing tests (table 4, Panel B) 
treatment group Advisors / FTE = 0.000 to 0.125   Advisors / FTE = 0.129 to 0.167   Advisors / FTE = 0.176 to 0.250 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
  
Unadjusted 
difference t-test   
Adjusted 
difference t-test   
Unadjusted 
difference t-test   
Adjusted 
difference t-test   
Unadjusted 
difference t-test   
Adjusted 
difference t-test 
FTE -8.838 -4.63   -13.173 -4.20   2.438 1.18   1.890 0.77   7.304 3.48   9.706 3.78 
ΔFTE 0.031 1.74   -0.009 -0.33   -0.026 -1.40   -0.030 -1.45   -0.015 -0.76   -0.007 -0.28 
Retail Bankers /FTE -0.019 -1.27   -0.092 -4.27   -0.013 -0.82   0.007 0.42   0.038 2.39   0.085 4.98 
Size (8 to 20 employees) 0.378 5.32   0.151 1.33   0.098 1.25   0.133 1.56   -0.522 -7.22   -0.196 -2.94 
Size (20 employees or more) -0.073 -0.98   0.286 2.61   -0.087 -1.15   -0.131 -1.53   0.178 2.27   -0.149 -1.91 
Footing -0.005 -0.09   -0.224 -2.70   -0.009 5.32   0.151 1.33   0.047 0.87   0.195 3.03 
Δfooting -0.010 -1.75   -0.001 -0.12   0.005 -0.98   0.286 2.61   0.005 0.86   0.007 0.89 
Unemployment rate 0.004 0.52   0.019 1.95   -0.011 1.18   1.890 0.77   0.003 0.48   -0.004 -0.47 
Population 0 to 50,000 -0.132 -2.56   -0.001 -0.01   0.016 -0.82   0.007 0.42   0.124 2.24   0.098 1.47 
Population 50,000 to 100,000 0.049 0.68   -0.219 -1.86   0.048 -1.40   -0.030 -1.45   -0.051 -0.66   0.100 1.03 
Region 1 0.100 1.97   -0.070 -1.06   0.007 -0.18   0.010 0.17   -0.134 -2.47   -0.095 -1.35 
Region 2 -0.041 -0.89   -0.124 -1.46   0.016 0.81   0.003 0.43   0.022 0.44   0.047 0.72 
Region 3 -0.111 -1.98   0.058 0.71   0.007 -1.57   -0.021 -2.91   0.108 1.78   -0.034 -0.49 
Region 4 0.226 4.17   0.170 2.02   -0.196 0.29   -0.007 -0.11   -0.059 -0.97   -0.017 -0.23 
Region 5 -0.002 -0.05   0.100 1.12   0.024 0.65   0.120 1.57   -0.035 -0.61   -0.006 -0.08 
Region 6 0.074 1.17   -0.128 -1.17   0.040 0.14   -0.016 -0.26   -0.065 -0.94   0.060 0.68 
Region 7 0.000     0.000     0.000 0.34   0.061 1.21   0.000     0.000   
Region 8 -0.246 -5.25   -0.007 -0.12   0.100 0.12   0.045 0.66   0.164 3.11   0.044 1.03 
   Note: This table reports improvements in the balance of the sample (used in Table 5) after controlling for the Generalized Propensity Score. In order to implement the balancing 
tests, the sample was split in tertiles on the basis of treatment levels. The "unadjusted difference" represents the difference in averages of the covariates between branches in a 
given tertile of treatments (the "treated" branches) and branches outside of the tertile. To calculate the "adjusted difference", the generalized propensity scores of all observations 
in a given tertile of treatments were split into quintiles. Subsequently, based on their propensity scores, the non-treated branches are are assigned to the quintiles. The adjusted 




  TABLE A2.4  Impact of Advisors on Sales Per Employee - Generalized 
Propensity Score Estimates 
Advisors / FTE 10% 15% 20% 25% 
Baseline Estimates (Table 4, panel B)         
  -0.006 -0.014 -0.021 -0.023 
 
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Observations 178 178 178 178 
Excluding observations with zero treatment       
 
-0.021 -0.035 -0.039 -0.032 
  [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Observations 148 148 148 148 
Excluding observations with zero treatment and with overlap conditions imposed   
 
0.210 0.253 0.236 0.214 
  [0.027]*** [0.027]*** [0.027]*** [0.027]*** 
Observations 70 70 70 70 
   Note: The numbers in this table are estimates of the impact of having a certain share of bankers per 
branch employee (with percentage shares ordered by column) on sales per employee in a branch. 
The estimates represent difference-in-difference estimates of the dose-response function at various 
ratios of bankers to employees. The first difference is the difference in sales per employee between 
branches with 5 percent bankers per employee and branches with a higher share of bankers per 
employee and the second difference is between sales per employee in Quarters 17 to 20 and sales per 
employee in quarters 9 to 12. The first set of estimates is from Table 5. In the second set of 
estimates, the observations with zero bankers were eliminated. For the third set of estimates, the 
branches with non-zero treatment were divided into tertiles based on their treatment level. Branches 
outside of each treatment group are eliminated from the sample if their propensity score at the 
median treatment in the treatment group is less than the propensity score at the second percentile of 
propensity scores in the treatment group. See Appendix B for details. Standard errors are 





FIGURE A2.1 First Treatment Period 
 
   Note: this figure plots the results of regressions of branch characteristics used in the estimation of the generalized 
propensity score (see table A1) on the treatment variable (Bankers / FTE) in quarter 7. The t-statistics "without 
GPS" are t-statistics on Bankers/FTE from regressions that include only Bankers/FTE and a constant. The t-statistics 
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FIGURE A2.2 Second Treatment Period 
 
   Note: this figure plots the results of regressions of branch characteristics used in the estimation of the generalized 
propensity score (see table A1) on the treatment variable (Advisors / FTE) in quarter 13. The t-statistics "without 
GPS" are t-statistics on Bankers/FTE from regressions that include only Bankers/FTE and a constant. The t-statistics 
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